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Corporate Social Responsibility and Foreign Direct 
Investment 
The Indian Investment Treaty Approach and Beyond 
Leïla Choukroune1   
"There is one kind of charity common enough among us… It is that patchwork philanthropy, which 
clothes the ragged, feeds the poor, and heals the sick. I am far from decrying the noble spirit, which 
seeks to help a poor or suffering fellow being. [However] what advances a nation or a community is 
not so much to prop up its weakest and most helpless members, but to lift up the best and the most 
gifted, so as to make them of the greatest service to the country.2" 
Jamsetji Tata, Founder of the Tata group 
“ (…) 1. Every company having net worth of rupees five hundred crore or more, or turnover 
of rupees one thousand crore or more or a net profit of rupees five crore or more during any 
financial year shall constitute a Corporate Social Responsibility Committee (…) 5. The Board 
of every company referred to in sub-section (1), shall ensure that the company spends, in 
every financial year, at least two per cent of the average net profits of the company made 
during the three immediately preceding financial years, in pursuance of its Corporate Social 
Responsibility Policy (…)”.  
Section 135, Indian Company Act 2013 (chosen abstracts) 
Abstract 
Very few countries have yet adopted a legally binding definition of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and ascribe certain clear obligations to the duty bearer i.e. the 
Company. That is exactly what India has done with the Section 135 of the 2013 
Company Act and, a few years later, the less daring Article 12 of the 2015 new model 
BIT, which however clearly echoes a unique endeavour to address the societal needs 
of a 1.3 billion population still massively suffering from poverty.  In critically 
addressing the inclusion of CSR related provisions in International Investment 
Agreements (I) and the Indian Way to CSR (II), this article reflects upon the pressing 
need for an alternative and legal approach shifting from mere responsibilities and 
values to rights. We indeed conclude in supporting the Indian legislative and treaty 
initiatives, but also in suggesting to go one step further in adopting, in India and 
globally, a Human Rights-Based (HRBA) approach to international treaty negotiation 
and dispute settlement for it is the only perspective, which is inclusive and sustainable 
as it rests upon the shared inalienable and indivisible rights of all and for all.  
                                                        
1  Professor of International Law and Director of the University’s thematic area in Democratic 
Citizenship, University of Portsmouth (UK). Former Director of the CSH, New Delhi, India. 
Leila.choukroune@port.ac.uk. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Bhaskar Chatterjee 
for the exclusive interview he has accepted to give me. Alessandra Silva, at the time Master student at 
the University of Maastricht, should also be thanked for her interest in this topic and participation to 
some research assistance. 
2 This approach of philanthropy translated into Tata’s support for higher education and research from 
the London School of Economics (LSE) to the creation of TISS: Tata Institute for Social Sciences and 
many more initiatives.  
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Introduction  
In the night of the 2nd to 3rd December 1984, “an unpunished horrendous industrial 
mass disaster” took the lives of 8,000 people3. Later, again, 15,000 to 20,000 persons 
died of the consequences of the poisonous gas explosion4 5 6. There are many ways of 
narrating a more than 30-year legal dispute and human disaster, which happened at 
the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, 
India7. But the Bhopal tragedy, which resulted from a Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), was rapidly considered as one of the worst industrial catastrophes of all times. 
It transformed into a judicial epic described by Prof. Upendra Baxi as a “valiant” 
“violated” and “lethal” litigation, which has until now failed to deliver justice to a 
massive number of victims of egregious human rights violation who have been 
repeatedly abused by the impossibility to seek justice and the morally irresponsible 
and legally unaccountable perpetrators of multiple and repeated crimes: the 
Corporation and the State8.  
Just as in our discussions on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in today’s 
international investment agreements (IIAs) and in the Indian context in particular, 
responsibilities, values and rights intersected and interplayed in a human tragedy 
which unfolded on the following basis: on the corporate front to start with, UCIL was 
the Indian subsidiary of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), with Indian Government 
controlling a 49.1% stake. In 1994, the Supreme Court of India allowed UCC to sell 
its 50.9% share. Union Carbide sold UCIL, the Bhopal plant operator, to Eveready 
Industries India Limited. The plant was later handed over one more time to McLeod 
Russel (India) Ltd. In addition, Dow Chemical Company purchased Union Carbide in 
2001. As to the company’s governance, Warren Anderson was the Chairman of UCC 
and got arrested for homicide in December 1984 but later freed on bail of 2,000 USD 
upon the promise of a return to India, which he never fulfilled. On the litigation front 
then, in February 1985, the Government of India, in an unprecedented move 
supported by civil society activists, filed a claim for 3.3 billion USD in a US court. 
Before the many Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA) litigations of the late 1990s and                                                         
3  3000 according to the Indian government and 7000 to 8000 according to NGOs and Amnesty 
International.  
4 The Indian Supreme Court opened its 1989 order for out-of-court settlement as follows: “The Bhopal 
Gas Leak tragedy (…) was a horrendous industrial mass disaster, unparalleled in its magnitude and 
devastation and remains a ghastly monument to the dehumanising influence of inherently dangerous 
technologies”.  See, http://www.legalserviceindia.com/issues/topic1401-union-carbide-corporation-vs-
union-of-india-transfer-case.html  
5 For facts and figures and a large number of Bhopal related press and legal documents, see generally, 
the Business and Human Resource Centre data base and case summary available at: http://business-
humanrights.org/en/union-carbidedow-lawsuit-re-bhopal.  It is also interesting to take a look at the 
narration and timeline provided by Union Carbide available at: http://www.bhopal.com/Chronology ; 
the company logically insists on this prompt reaction and the many charitable initiatives it funded post-
catastrophe and the fact that in February 1989, within 10 days of the order, UCC and UCIL make full 
payment of the $470 million to the Government of India.  
6 See, Amnesty’s reports and recent posts available at: https://www.amnesty.org.in/action/detail/union-
carbide-and-dow-must-respect-the-indian-justice-system  
7 See Leïla Choukroune, “Human Rights in International Investment Disputes”, in Leïla Choukroune, 
Judging the State in International Trade and Investment Law, Sovereignty Modern, the Law and the 
Economics, Springer, 2016, pp.179-215. http://www.springer.com/la/book/9789811023583  
8 See Uprendra Baxi, Human Rights Responsibility of Multinational Corporations, Political Ecology of 
Injustice: Learning from Bhopal Thirty plus?, Business and Human Rights Journal (2016) 21–40.  
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2000s, this first Indian extraterritorial attempt to seek redress for corporate wrongful 
acts appeared as a revolutionary decision proportional to the dramatic character of 
what Supreme Court Justice Krishna Iyer described, in one of his brilliant 
formulations, as “Bhoposhima. 9” Unfortunately, the United States were not ready to 
become the world’s human rights court against their own economic interests and 
decided that the Bhopal case should be litigated in India. Only a few years later, in 
1989, and as per typical practice of multinational corporations (MNC), UC and the 
Indian government managed to strike, on the basis of Supreme Court Order, an out-
of-court settlement for a meagre USD 470 million that the company rapidly paid to 
the State10. The victims’ reaction to the unfair deal was immediate: writ petitions and 
reviews were filled, in the public interest, in the Indian Supreme Court, against the 
Bhopal arrangement. While supreme, the Court is not “infallible” and its 1989 but 
also 1994 (UC authorized to sell stakes) and 1996 (dilution of charges against Indian 
UC officials) decisions have proven so.11 Later, in 2004, it failed again to have the 
victims compensated despite an order to make use of the 470 million USD kept by the 
Central Bank since 1992! Warren Anderson could never be extradited to India and so 
prosecuted. While the seven Indian UC executives were eventually convicted in a 
2010 Court decision, they were bailed out, the Supreme Court later refusing to re-
open the case. In addition, another US-based lawsuit came to a (partial) conclusion 
when, in June 2012, the US district court dismissed the case against Union Carbide’s 
company and executives’ responsibility in the disaster. Unfortunately, the epic did not 
come to an end. Children with disabilities are born from Bhopal survivors every day, 
legal actions are still going on in Indian courts, and, from political complicity to 
corruption in non-transparent toxic waste management, one scam is discovered after 
the other.  
Opening this article with the Bhopal tragedy is not a mere coincidence. The recent 
inclusion of CSR related provisions, if not yet human rights, in international 
investment agreements illustrates the pressing need to reconcile “public and private 
interests” and “balance rights and obligations” that is, in a less consensual language, 
the requirement to protect, respect and remedy individual rights and their possible                                                         
9 Ibid, at 29; VR Krishna Iyer, Bhoposhima: Crime without Punishment (1991) 26:47 Economic and 
Political Weekly 2705.  
10 On this major Supreme Court of India decision, see, for example, Justice Delayed, the Loss through 
Law: Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1989), in, Zia Mody (ed) 10 Judgements That 
Changed India (Penguin Books India, India, 2013) pp. 93–114. 
Please see also the Order itself and the reasons listed by the Supreme Court to justify its decision in the 
name of urgency: “The basic consideration motivating the conclusion of the settlement was the 
compelling need for urgent relief. The suffering of the victims has been intense and unrelieved. 
Thousands of persons who pursued their own occupations for an humble and honest living have been 
rendered destitute by this ghastly disaster. Even after four years of litigation, basic questions of the 
fundamentals of the law as to liability of the Union Carbide Corporation and the quantum of damages 
are yet being debated. These, of course, are important issues, which need to be decided. But, when 
thousands of innocent citizens were in near destitute conditions, without adequate subsistence needs of 
food and medicine and with every coming morrow haunted by the spectre of death and continued 
agony, it would be heartless abstention, if the possibilities of immediate sources of relief were not 
explored. Considerations of excellence and niceties of legal principles were greatly over-shadowed by 
the pressing problems of very survival for a large number of victims.” Available at: 
http://www.legalserviceindia.com/issues/topic1401-union-carbide-corporation-vs-union-of-india-
transfer-case.html. 
11 See, BN Kirpal, Ashok H Desai, Gopal Subramaniam, Rajeev Dhavan & Raju Ramachandran (eds) 
Supreme But Not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India (OUP India, India, 2001) 
480. 
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violations. Be it in relation to the Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human 
Rights implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, the UN and 
UNESCO initiatives in favour of a culture of lawfulness, or the latest controversies on 
Investors States Dispute Settlement (ISDS), the urge for a profound change of 
mindset is perceptible globally12. The very definition of CSR has evolved from a 
philanthropic perspective and the inclusion of voluntary principles into business 
management to a more embedded approach of “shared values” to achieve “economic 
success” that is:  
“Policies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a 
company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions 
in the communities in which it operates. Shared value creation focuses on 
identifying and expanding the connections between societal and economic 
progress13”. 
However, very few countries have yet dared to adopt a legally binding definition of 
CSR and ascribe certain clear obligations to the duty bearer i.e. the Company. That is 
exactly what India has done with the Section 135 of the 2013 Company Act and, a 
few years later, the Article 12 of the 2015 new model BIT, which clearly echoes a 
unique endeavour to address the societal needs of a 1.3 billion population still 
massively suffering from poverty.  In critically addressing the inclusion of CSR 
related provisions in International Investment Agreements (I) and the Indian Way to 
CSR (II), this article will reflect upon the pressing need for an alternative and legal 
approach shifting from mere responsibilities and values to rights. We indeed conclude 
in supporting the Indian legislative and treaty initiatives, but also in suggesting to go 
one step further in adopting, in India and globally, a Human Rights-Based (HRBA) 
approach to international treaty negotiation and dispute settlement for it is the only 
perspective, which is inclusive and sustainable as it rests upon the shared inalienable 
and indivisible rights of all and for all14. 
  
                                                        
12 See https://www.unglobalcompact.org/library/2.  
13  In Michael Porter and Mark R. Kramer, “Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism and 
Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth”, Harvard Business Review, January-February 2011, p.6, 
available at: http://www.nuovavista.com/SharedValuePorterHarvardBusinessReview.PDF 
14 In this regard, the reconciliation between the so called fragmented domains of international law 
should be imminent as urgently expected. See Leïla Choukroune, “Human Rights in International 
Investment Disputes”, in Leïla Choukroune, Judging the State in International Trade and Investment 
Law, Sovereignty Modern, the Law and the Economics, op.cit and for a recent approach to this debate 
in TDM, T. Weiler (2018, forthcoming) "International Investment Law and International Human 
Rights Law: Reuniting Two Long Lost Siblings (Speaking Notes)" 
(TDM, ISSN 1875-4120) March 2018, www.transnational-dispute-management.com.  
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1. CSR and International Investment Agreements 
A. Approaching CSR 
From the early 2000s onwards, a vast body of literature has been published in 
international economic law on the merits, limitations and possible linkages of CSR 
with general international law and trade and investment in particular. Scholars were 
eager to interrogate the possibly binding nature of these apparently voluntary 
guidelines if read in conjunction with international law norms and principles hence 
complementing the existing discourse in economics, management or political 
sciences15. International organisations and other influential think tanks came up with 
policy guidelines and recommendations to integrate CSR in treaty drafting and 
progressively “legalize” their content. As a matter of fact, and in direct relation with 
international investment law, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) first published some recommendations, in 2004, on how to 
integrate CSR in international investment agreements16.  Having learnt the lessons 
from the dramatic failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
negotiated under the banner of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the UNCTAD, reflected upon the idea of social responsibility 
in considering that: 
 “The challenge is to balance the promotion and protection of liberalized 
market conditions for investors with the need to pursue development policies; 
social responsibility obligations are one way to move towards such a balance.”  
(…) In this light, the policy options discussed range from an absence of any 
reference to social responsibility in IIAs to the inclusion of non-binding 
standards through the reservation of regulatory powers in relation to social 
responsibility to the use of a no lowering of standard clause, home country 
promotional measures and, lastly, the inclusion of generally binding social 
responsibility provisions”17.  
The idea of framing and guiding the operation of Multinational Corporations (MNC) 
was not exactly new. From the mid-1970s, the OECD indeed published a number of 
versions of its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises while the UN later drafted a 
Code of conduct for Transnational Corporations18. Yet, including CSR provisions in 
IIAs was rather unprecedented and the three options described above looked the 
easiest: voluntary principles, no lowering of other standards, binding obligations. 
Others, like the Dutch think thank SOMO, proposed a more embedded approach to 
investment law and in particular: a clause limiting direct expropriation, a clause on 
disinvestment and another one on the limitation of “non-discrimination” in like 
circumstances to promote local infant industries19. 10 years later, the practice and                                                         
15 See, for example, Peter Muchlinski “Corporate Social Responsibility” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico 
Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter T. Muchlinski Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2
nd ed, 2007) at 100-104 and Part III “The Social Dimension”.  
16 See UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements - Key issues, Volume II, 2004, pp. 129-151.  
17 Ibid., p.130.  
18  See http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/guidelines/ and 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2891   
19 See https://www.somo.nl/investment-agreements-and-corporate-social-responsibility/  
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interrogations seemed to remain rather similar while a number of IIAs had integrated 
some forms of CSR provisions.  
B. Locating CSR 
In April 2016 indeed, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) published a 
landmark research paper on CSR in international trade and investment agreements 
and the implications for States, businesses and workers. Following the classic 
tripartite approach of the Organisation, the ILO interrogated the progressive 
“legalization” of CRS in government policies yet, at the same time, the vagueness of 
CSR treaty related provisions, which de facto limit the effectiveness of their 
implementation20. After all, CSR provisions are directly related to labour and the 
ability of international agreements to participate equitably to the development of 
countries and regions of the world where the capacity or willingness of governments 
to protect human rights and so labour rights are often challenged by the imbalances of 
power between multinational corporations and weaker States with limited if not 
absent regulatory power.  So, the ILO formulated the following hypothesis: “one way 
to address these concerns and to assure that trade and investment go hand-in-hand 
with decent work is through the promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR)”21.  In line with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) analysis and its recent investment policy reform papers, the ILO is of the 
opinion that: “CSR would be better placed addressing only investors’ behaviour in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) as a means to rebalance the investors’ rights 
conferred in these treaties (for example, access to investor-state dispute settlement) 
with the rights of states to regulate in the public interest, and to ensure the promotion 
of responsible investments”22,23.  However, the evolution of the international trade 
and investment treaties scene requires a more precise analysis. With the boom in 
mega-deals or trade agreements including an investment chapter modelled on the 
basis of the historical North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a number of 
labour, sustainability and CSR related provisions have been introduced by treaty 
drafters apparently also eager to refer, often in the preamble of the same agreements, 
to existing ILO conventions, UN guiding principles and other major international 
labour references or statutes. When analysing these provisions, one is immediately 
struck by their vague character, which appears sometimes in contrast with more 
stringent and legally binding legal requirements adopted by the same Sate(s) 
domestically. The tension between voluntarism and legalization has largely been 
debated24. While certain CSR related voluntary principles could indeed foster some                                                         
20  See ILO, Research Paper N°13, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Trade and 
Investment Agreements: Implications for States, Businesses and Workers, April 2016, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
inst/documents/publication/wcms_476193.pdf.  
21 Ibid, p.1.  
22 See UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 2015, available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf.  
23 Ibid, p.2. 
24  See for example, Gond, J.; Kang, N.; Moon, J. “The government of self-regulation: On the 
comparative dynamics of corporate social responsibility”, in Economy and Society, Vol. 40, No. 4, 
2011, pp. 640–671 and Blackett, A. “Codes of corporate conduct and the labour regulatory state in 
developing countries” in J.J. Kirton and M.J. Trebilcock (eds.), Hard choices, soft Law. Voluntary 
standards in global trade, environment and social governance, Ashgate, 2004, pp. 121–133. And at the 
other end of the same spectrum, Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (ed.), Human Rights Obligations of 
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innovative companies policies, it is highly likely that other basic requirements in 
terms of working hours, child labour or even the right to go on strike or collectively 
bargain are better enforced if clearly “legalized25”. The concept of legalization has 
equally been largely discussed in legal and political literature over the past decade and 
could indeed be explained as follow: 
“‘Legalization’’ refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions 
may (or may not) possess. These characteristics are defined along three 
dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states 
or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or 
commitments. Specifically, it means that they are legally bound by a rule or 
commitment in the sense that their behaviour thereunder is subject to scrutiny 
under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law, and 
often of domestic law as well. Precision means that rules unambiguously 
define ne the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means 
that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and 
apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules. Each 
of these dimensions is a matter of degree and gradation, not a rigid dichotomy, 
and each can vary independently. Consequently, the concept of legalization 
encompasses a multidimensional continuum, ranging from the ‘‘ideal type’’ of 
legalization where all three properties are maximized; to ‘‘hard’’ legalization, 
where all three (or at least obligation and delegation) are high; through 
multiple forms of partial or ‘‘soft’’ legalization involving different 
combinations of attributes; and finally to the complete absence of legalization, 
another ideal type. None of these dimensions far less the full spectrum of 
legalization—can be fully operationalize.” 
Are IIAs CSR provisions “legalized” that is indeed drafted in the form of legally 
binding obligation defined with precision and able to be implemented and interpreted 
by way of delegation to third parties? Well, not quite so if the letter of the law is taken 
into consideration here. The following examples are revealing of the type of CSR 
related provisions one can find since the mid-2000 in IIAs. The 2007 Norwegian 
model BIT could serve as an illustration of the first “generation” of international 
agreements including some sort of CSR provisions, which were actually quite daring 
in their combined references to international law, labour and human rights from the 
Preamble: 26 
“Emphasising the importance of corporate social responsibility;  
Recognising that the development of economic and business ties can promote 
respect for internationally recognised labour rights;  
                                                                                                                                                              
Businesses: Beyond the Responsibility to Respect?, Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
  
25 On the concept of legalization, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal, “The Concept of Legalisation”, International Organization 
54, 3, Summer 2000, pp. 401–419, available at: 
https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/concept.pdf . 
26 See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2873  
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Reaffirming their commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in accordance with their obligations under international 
law, including the principles set out in the United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
Recognising that the promotion of sustainable investments is critical for the 
further development of national and global economies as well as for the 
pursuit of national and global objectives for sustainable development, and 
understanding that the promotion of such investments requires cooperative 
efforts of investors, host governments and home governments;”  
This preamble needs to be read in conjunction with the Article 32 (Corporate Social 
Responsibility):  
“The Parties agree to encourage investors to conduct their investment 
activities in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and to participate in the United Nations Global Compact.”  
While a commendable initiative referring to the existing non-binding instruments of 
that time, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Global 
Compact, the language remains rather vague and no particular obligation is set for 
Parties.  
Canadian treaties of the late 2000 offered a good overview of a sort of second 
generation of CSR provisions in IIAs or Foreign Trade Agreements (FTAs). In this 
regard, they are quite remarkable as progressively moving towards a form of 
legalization often combining references to voluntary CSR principles with more 
binding labour provisions sometimes included in a dedicated Chapter. A pioneer of 
sustainable investment treaty drafting, Canada has been later emulated internationally 
in a number of other treaties. As a matter of fact, the 2009 Canada-Peru Free Trade 
Agreement and its Chapter 16 on Labour (Article 1601 and 1603) is of particular 
interest as it goes much further than simple CSR incantation27: 
“The Parties affirm their obligations as members of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and their commitments to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) and its Follow-Up as well 
as their continuing respect for each other’s Constitution and laws.”’ 
(…) 
In order to further the foregoing objectives, the Parties´ mutual obligations are 
set out in the Labour Cooperation Agreement between Canada and the 
Republic of Peru (LCA) that addresses, inter alia: 
(a) general obligations concerning the internationally recognized labour 
principles and rights that are to be embodied in each Party’s labour laws;                                                         
27 See http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-
perou/fta-ale/16.aspx?lang=eng  
See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5589  
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(b) derogation from domestic labour laws in order to encourage trade or 
investment; 
(c) effective enforcement of labour laws through appropriate government 
action, private rights of action, procedural guarantees, public information and 
awareness; 
(d) institutional mechanisms to oversee the implementation of the LCA, such 
as a Ministerial Council and National Administration Offices to receive and 
review public communications on specified labour law matters and to enable 
cooperative activities to further the objectives of the LCA; 
(e) general and ministerial consultations regarding the implementation of the 
LCA and its obligations; and 
(f) independent review panels to hold hearings and make determinations 
regarding alleged non-compliance with the terms of the LCA and, if requested, 
monetary assessments.” 
A number of recent Canadian Bilateral Investment Treaties go one step further in 
terms of CSR in abandoning the language of voluntarism for an apparently more 
binding formula as in the 2014 Canada-Mali BIT or 2015 Canada Burkina-Faso BIT 
Article 16 (Corporate Social Responsibility)28:  
“Each Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or 
subject to its jurisdiction to incorporate internationally recognized standards of 
corporate social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such as 
statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the 
Parties. These principles address issues such as labour, the environment, 
human rights, community relations and anti-corruption.” 
This being said, the action required “incorporation in practices and internal policies” 
is only encouraged and one remains quite far from a “legalization” in the possible 
absence of biding requirements in domestic law.  However, a notable characteristic 
needs to be highlighted here as it is an exception in most trade and investment 
treaties. Indeed, the Article 21 of the Canada Burkina-Faso BIT (Claim by an Investor 
of a Party on Its Own Behalf or on Behalf of an Enterprise) does not exclude CSR of 
the list of possible claims. One could then imagine – a quite unlike situation from a 
pure cynical business perspective – that the investor could claim against the State 
(Burkina Faso) for having not “encouraged” the incorporation of CSR in its internal 
practices and policies.  
Another interesting recent example of incorporation of CSR provision in IIAs is 
offered by the practice of Brazil, infamously known for its opposition to BITs, with 
the drafting of quite original Agreements on Cooperation and Facilitation of 
Investments (ACFIs). In the 2015 Brazil-Malawi ACFI, for example, the Article 9 
(Corporate Social Responsibility) provides a long list of voluntary principles and 
                                                        
28 See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3460  
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standards for “responsible business conduct” consistent with the host State law and 
introduced by the following paragraph:  
“Investors and their investment shall strive to achieve the highest possible 
level of contribution to the sustainable development of the Host Party and the 
local community, through the adoption of a high degree of socially responsible 
practices, based on the voluntary principles and standards set out in this 
Article.29” 
While the lists are always very detailed and combining the most recent standards and 
businesses practices, the language remains soft, often vague and stresses the voluntary 
nature of CSR obligation.  
A more detailed study of CSR provisions in recent IIAs would naturally require a 
dedicated contribution on the basis of a systematic global analysis, but to conclude on 
this brief overview, the following elements are perceptible today in a large variety of 
treaties: very few Parties have chosen to legalise CSR provisions and still prefer to 
relate to its voluntary character; the language adopted hence remains soft and rather 
vague despite certain “non lowering of domestic law provisions” clauses; CSR claims 
are generally excluded and there are limited mechanisms of implementation such as, 
for example, Committees or Contact Points. A better proposal is however put forward 
in FTAs comprising a labour Chapter which de facto renders a number of CSR labour 
related obligations biding in conjunction with existing domestic legalizations 
themselves integrating international norms. This traditional dialogue, but also the 
tension between international and national law, is indeed key and has been well 
illustrated in the Indian way to CSR. A relatively vague treaty provision might indeed 
suffice if a more stringent and binding domestic legal framework is provided together 
with existing judicial mechanism guaranteeing its implementation. 
II. From “Patchwork Philanthropy” to Legal Obligation: CSR the 
Indian Way 
A. Legalization  
In 2013, India globally pioneered a novel social experiment: the legalization of 
precise CSR targets in domestic law.  Although not immediately welcomed nor 
supported by the private sector (see below Dr. Chatterjee’s interview below), this 
reform did not come as a complete surprise for the astute observer of Indian business 
life. India is deeply influenced by ethical and societal values, which find their roots in 
a long history of syncretism. Be it the Muslim Zakaat (donation to the poor), the 
Hindu principle of Dhramada (benefaction) or Daashant (the tenth part or 
contributing one tenth of resources) found in Sikhism, the idea of “giving back to the 
community” as one would express in a modern CSR manner was present throughout 
Indian business history. India had clearly illustrated itself from the early days of 
modern capitalism by some fascinating and unique philanthropic practices lead by 
major industrialists families such as the Tatas or Birlas 30,31,32. In addition, another                                                         
29 See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4715  
30 See KPMG India and Assocham, Corporate Social Responsibility, Towards a Sustainable Future : A 
White Paper, 2008,  http://www.in.kpmg.com/pdf/csr_whitepaper.pdf  
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reform had preceded the 2013 Company Act amendments:  in 2010 indeed, the Indian 
Government had made CSR mandatory for more than 200 Public Sector Undertakings 
(PSU), asking them to spend 0.5% to 5% (on an average, 2%) of their net profit on 
Corporate social responsibility. These “ Guidelines on Corporate Social 
Responsibility for Central Public Sector Enterprises” were seen as a continuation of 
the earlier CSR voluntary guidelines, making CSR expenditure mandatory33. The 
concept was simple: “Public corporations have legal responsibility to maximize 
shareholders profits; but a shift in corporate mindset led by social expectations and 
pressure is causing business leaders to rethink their responsibilities with corporate 
performance measured in terms of economic impact, social impact and environmental 
impact, commonly called the Triple Bottom Line34”. It revealed efficient too as public 
sector companies had spent 66.7% of what they were required to spend (against 82% 
for private companies) in the first year of mandatory CSR35. In about a century, the 
Indian way to CSR had so gone from Tata’s Patchwork philanthropy to a legal 
obligation supported by the State and public and private enterprises equally.  But what 
were the 2013 Company Act amendments requiring precisely? The Article 135 of the 
2013 Company Act read as follow: 
“135. Corporate Social Responsibility 
(1) Every company having net worth of rupees five hundred crore or more, or 
turnover of rupees one thousand crore or more or a net profit of rupees five 
crore or more during any financial year shall constitute a Corporate Social 
Responsibility Committee of the Board consisting of three or more directors, 
out of which at least one director shall be an independent director. 
(2) The Board's report under sub-section (3) of section 134 shall disclose the 
composition of the Corporate Social Responsibility Committee. 
(3) The Corporate Social Responsibility Committee shall,— 
(a) formulate and recommend to the Board, a Corporate Social 
Responsibility Policy which shall indicate the activities to be 
undertaken by the company as specified in Schedule VII; 
(b) recommend the amount of expenditure to be incurred on the 
activities referred to in clause (a); and 
                                                                                                                                                              
31  See for Tata : http://www.tata.com/sustainability/articlesinside/corporate-social-responsibility and 
Birla: http://www.adityabirla.com/csr/overview; and again for a much more recent yet very successful 
and quite revealing company of the new digital economy Paytm: https://paytm.com/about-us/csr-3/  
32 On Indian CSR History, see Nayan Mitra and René Schmidpeter, Corporate Social Responsibility in 
India, Springer, 2017: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-319-41781-3;   
33  See 
http://megplanning.gov.in/circular/Guidelines%20on%20Corporate%20Social%20Responsibility%20f
or%20CPSEs.PDF   
34 Ibid.  
35  According to LiveMint reproducing think Tank data, see: 
https://www.livemint.com/Specials/PiwvOfqACWArNyQX45THwJ/CSR-spend-How-public-and-
private-sectors-fared.html  
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(c) monitor the Corporate Social Responsibility Policy of the company 
from time to time. 
(4) The Board of every company referred to in sub-section (1) shall,— 
(a) after taking into account the recommendations made by the 
Corporate Social Responsibility Committee, approve the Corporate 
Social Responsibility Policy for the company and disclose contents of 
such Policy in its report and also place it on the company's website, if 
any, in such manner as may be prescribed; and 
(b) ensure that the activities as are included in Corporate Social 
Responsibility Policy of the company are undertaken by the company. 
(5) The Board of every company referred to in sub-section (1), shall ensure 
that the company spends, in every financial year, at least two per cent. of the 
average net profits of the company made during the three immediately 
preceding financial years, in pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility 
Policy: 
Provided that the company shall give preference to the local area and areas 
around it where it operates, for spending the amount earmarked for Corporate 
Social Responsibility activities: 
Provided further that if the company fails to spend such amount, the Board 
shall, in its report made under clause (o) of sub-section (3) of section 134, 
specify the reasons for not spending the amount. 
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section “average net profit” shall be 
calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 198.” 
A  three steps process was then put in place: 1. The constitution of a CSR Committee, 
which advises and monitors the Company’s Board on CSR related policies and 
activities; 2. The actual spending “in every financial year, at least two per cent of the 
average net profits of the company made during the three immediately preceding 
financial years, in pursuance of its Corporate Social Responsibility Policy”; 3. The 
production of a report explaining and justifying the company’s failure to spend if any. 
Finally, these spending should target local communities and a number of priority 
areas which had been identified by the government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
        
Interview with Dr. Bhaskar Chatterjee, the “Father of India CSR” 
1. What was the general political and economic context of the inclusion of the 
Section 135 in the Indian companies Act of 2013?  
This was the end of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and about 4 months 
before the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power. India was doing extremely 
well economically with a 7.9% GDP growth. The general corporate context was very 
positive. So the feeling was that Companies could then give back to society.  
2. What were the government’s expectations? What were the private sectors 
expectations?  
As far as the government expectations were concerned, it was felt that companies, 
which had made an adequate amount of profit (from INR 5 Crore (50 million)) could 
afford to give a share of this profit to the poorest sections of society.  For the private 
sector however, the feeling was that CSR has been done for a long time in any case 
and since companies were paying taxes they were doing enough already. The 2% 
requirement was then first seen as a mere additional tax.  
3. What served your (legal) reasoning in drafting the provision?  
For the public sector, the 2010 Guidelines for giving a part of the profit to CSR had 
already been issued. The new section 135 inserted into the Companies Act at that time 
was in tune with what was issued to the public sector in the 2010 Guidelines. So 
section 135 is the essence of what was already applicable to the Public Sector in 
India. As I served as Secretary to the Government of India, in the Department of 
Public Enterprises, I had already drafted the text of the Guidelines and so it was then 
easy to draft section 135. 
4. Any comparative or international inspiration? 
Michael E. Porter’s approach and landmark article with Mark A. Kramer on how to 
create shared value as well as the seemingly simple idea to giving back to society 
certainly inspired me 36 . Porter’s approach was nevertheless not resting upon 
legislation but only shared value: corporate should do business with and for the 
poorest sector to the benefit of all. I changed this around to a large extent: to me, the 
poor must not be the target of corporate business. Corporate must legally make their 
profit and after making this profit, they must contribute 2% of it to the poorest of the 
poor through civil society organizations. So, two ideas were quite novel as concepts 
here: 1. There must be legislation. 2. Corporates must make profit and only after they 
do, should give 2% from it to the poor.  
                                                        
36 See Michael Porter and Mark R. Kramer, “Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism and 
Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth”, Harvard Business Review, January-February 2011, 
available at: http://www.nuovavista.com/SharedValuePorterHarvardBusinessReview.PDF  
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5. How is this provision inscribed more largely in Indian corporate and 
regulatory history? 
Historically, there was nothing in regulatory history. There was no regulation of any 
kind in the domain of CSR at all. This was completely unique to India and to global 
corporate law.  
6. 4 years later, how do you reflect upon the application of the provision by 
Indian and foreign corporations?  
By large it has gone pretty well. Expenditure and compliance have largely improved. 
Corporates now also have stopped being defensive. They do see this as an opportunity 
and not a challenge anymore. If they do it well and systematically, it helps build their 
brand image and their value to society. Overall, the whole perception improved 
considerably. For example, we had presumed that about 10,000 companies would 
need to comply, but for 2016-17, our expectations were exceeded as about 17,000 
companies have complied with the 2% rule. As to the expenditures: 6,000 crore 
(approx.) were spent for the first year, 9,000 crore (approx.) in the second year and for 
2016-17: the estimated expenditure is 16,000 crore! This shows a substantial jump 
both in the number of compliant companies and in the money actually spent for CSR 
by them.  
7. What remains to be done for a better implementation by foreign investors? 
Most of these foreign investors are MNCs. They have had a good history of CSR. 
They do understand that for the Indian branch of their operations, they have to spend 
2% of their profits and so comply with the Indian legal requirements. They are doing 
this systematically. We have good examples of compliance by companies such as 
BASF, Samsung, LG, and BOSCH who all have demonstrated quite exceptional work 
in CSR in India. 
8. Do you see a possible interaction between the Section 135 and the Article 12 
of the BIT model?  
Yes of course. The new BIT model Article 12 reflects the impact of Section 135. 
India as a country is expecting more of foreign investors in development initiatives 
reaching out to the poor. There are strong interactions.  
9. From your personal professional experience in dealing with major FDI, do 
you see the article 12 and domestic CSR related provisions and the Section 
135 in particular playing a positive role in balancing investors and State’s 
rights and obligations?  Or, on the contrary do you see these as deterring 
FDI?  
Yes very much so they do play a positive role. They are not contrary to each other at 
all and they do not deter FDI. Many companies investing in India are doing CSR in 
their own countries of origin. Virtually, every company is doing something in relation 
to CSR. So these provisions do not at all deter FDI. Sometimes, it even comes at as 
attraction. It sends a message: in the course of doing business in India we look 
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forward to you participating to the development of the country. It sends a positive 
message and to the home and host countries at the same time.  
Dr. Bhaskar Chatterjee, popularly known in India as the "father of CSR," is 
former Director General and CEO Indian Institute for corporate affaire, 
Ministry of Corporate Affairs, India.   
This interview has been conducted by Prof. Leïla Choukroune with Dr Bhaskar 
Chatterjee in March 2018.  
        
B. Implementation 
Four years after the adoption of the Section 135 of the 2013 Company Act what are 
the results of this dramatic policy decision including in relation to the inclusion on the 
article 12 (CSR) of the 2015 Indian BIT model?  
According to a recently published Working Paper of the Universities of Chicago and 
Michigan Law Schools, there could be a “negative and substantial” effect on the value 
of the studied firms, yet at the same time “a significant increase in CSR activities” 37. 
Interestingly, according to the same study it may well be that firms, which spent less 
than 2% of their profit on CSR have increased their spending, while, on the contrary, 
firms which spent more have reduced their CSR expenditure after Section 135 came 
into effect. These findings have to be taken into account with certain prudence while 
other studies seem to show, on the basis of qualitative interviews with CSR leaders, a 
real adherence to the new requirements and some keen investment in CSR activities38. 
Spending is of course not an end to a mean. It remains to be seen how, where, what 
for and by who are these CSR activities carried upon, an interrogation, which also 
questions the role of the civil society and NGOs as well as that of Companies CSR 
departments and executives. 
                                                        
37  See Dhammika Dharmapala and Vikramaditya S. Khanna, The Impact of Mandated Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Evidence from India's Companies Act of 2013, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862714.  
38 See the Consultancy firm Equal Innovation’s Report, India’s CSR - Taking Singles Instead of Hitting 
Sixes available at: http://www.equalinnovation.com/india-csr-report.html.  The top 16 Tata companies 
spent INR 1,198 crore on CSR in the last two fiscal years, according to data from Think through 
Consulting. TCS, the second-largest listed company in India based on market capitalisation, alone 
spent Rs 380 crore on CSR projects last financial year.  See: 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporate-trends/tcs-to-contribute-a-sizable-
portion-of-its-csr-fund-to-tata-trusts/articleshow/60215344.cms 
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Source: Equal Innovation’s Report, India’s CSR - Taking Singles Instead of Hitting Sixes 
However, it is even more relevant for us to further investigate the link between the 
Section 135 of the 2013 Company and the Article 12 (Corporate Social 
Responsibility) of the 2015 Indian BIT Model, which reads as follow:  
“Investors and their enterprises operating within its territory of each Party 
shall endeavour to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards 
of corporate social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such 
as statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the 
Parties. These principles may address issues such as labour, the environment, 
human rights, community relations and anti-corruption.” 
The non-binding language of the BIT model provision provides an interesting 
correspondence but also an apparent departure from the legalization of CSR that is 
now found in Indian domestic law. From a legalization perspective indeed, the Article 
12 of the new BIT model is rather disappointing for it is does not define any 
obligation, is imprecise and of course cannot be clearly implemented. The only 
element of relative satisfaction could be found in the reference to human rights, a 
positive move, which could be read in conjunction with other “non-investment 
concerns” related provisions one can identify in the model and in recent Indian IIAs 
practice more generally39. That the 2015 Model BIT is disappointing, incoherent and 
often departs from previous legislative and regulatory progresses made internally in 
India is not a surprise and had been highlighted by the Indian Law Commission prior 
to its adoption. It is also largely discussed in this Special Issue of TDM40. One could                                                         
39  See Leïla Choukroune, « Indian International Investment Agreements and “Non Investment 
Concerns”: time for a right(s) approach” Jindal Global Law Review (2016) 7: 157, available at: 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41020-016-0030-y   
40 For well argued and constructive criticism, see the Indian Law Commission Report: Report 260 of 
the Law Commission of India at: http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report260.pdf  
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however hope, as alluded to above, that the natural interactions between treaty law 
and a domestic Indian law, now more demanding than its international obligations, 
could plead in favour of a better integration of CSR related provisions to further the 
country’s social ambitions internally and externally.  
Conclusion: Responsibilities, Values and Rights 
While CSR has evolved from corporate responsibilities to “shared values”, which are 
sometimes formulated in a legalized manner, it is now ample time to move towards a 
discourse and practice of rights. A Human Rights-Based (HRBA) approach to 
international treaty negotiation and dispute settlement has to be definitively adopted 
for it is the only perspective, which is inclusive and sustainable as it rests upon the 
shared inalienable and indivisible rights of all and for all. 
According to the United Nations, the following criteria have to be met to define a 
HRBA41: 
• Universality and inalienability: Human rights are universal and inalienable: As 
stated in the article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”  
• Indivisibility: Human rights are indivisible. Whether civil, cultural, economic, 
political or social, they are all inherent to the dignity of every person. There is no 
hierarchy of rights.  
• Interdependence and interrelatedness: The realization of one right often 
depends on the realization of others. Rights are not separable.  
• Equality and non-discrimination: All human beings are equal. Discrimination 
on the basis of sex, religion, ethnicity (etc.) cannot be tolerated.  
• Participation and inclusion: Human beings are entitled individually and 
collectively to active, free and meaningful participation in, contribution to and 
enjoyment of civil, economic, social, cultural and political development.  
• Empowerment:  Human beings are empowered to claim their rights. 
• Accountability and respect for the rule of law: There is a need to identify 
‘rights holders’ and corresponding ‘duty bearers’. These include both positive 
obligations to protect, promote and fulfil human rights, as well as negative 
obligations to abstain from rights violations. A HRBA requires the development 
of laws, administrative procedures, and practices and mechanisms to ensure the 
fulfilment of entitlements, as well as opportunities to address denials and 
violations. It is local and global and yet again glocal in that international norms 
and standards are integrated at the local level. 
In doing so, novel treaty drafting would echo recent arbitral decisions, which seem to 
timidly move towards the direction of a greater appreciation of CSR, if not entirely 
human rights as international law obligations, as illustrated in the Urbaser case (as 
concessionaire, Urbaser supplied water and sewerage services in the Province of 
Buenos Aires replacing in the context of water privatisation):  
                                                          
41 See UNESCO Strategy on Human Rights, The Human Rights-Based Approach to the United Nations 
System, 2006, and UNICEF, a Human Rights Based Approach to Education for All, 2007. 
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 “1195. The Tribunal may mention in this respect that international law 
accepts corporate social responsibility as a standard of crucial importance for 
companies operating in the field of international commerce. This standard 
includes commitments to comply with human rights in the framework of those 
entities’ operations conducted in countries other than the country of their seat 
or incorporation. In light of this more recent development, it can no longer be 
admitted that companies operating internationally are immune from becoming 
subjects of international law. On the other hand, even though several 
initiatives undertaken at the international scene are seriously targeting 
corporations human rights conduct, they are not, on their own, sufficient to 
oblige corporations to put their policies in line with human rights law. The 
focus must be, therefore, on contextualizing a corporation’s specific activities 
as they relate to the human right at issue in order to determine whether any 
international law obligations attach to the non-State individual”42. 
The artificial fragmentation of international law is actually at stake here. Be it for 
non-State actors (the Company) but also for Lex Specialis (IIAs), the need for a 
profound change of paradigm is evident and appears as the only solution able to 
participate in the reunification of international law on the basis of a (human) rights-
based approach. A HRBA not only encompass essential human rights principles, but 
it also proves an effective tool to international law reunification and coherent 
application from treaty drafting to dispute resolution. As applied to investment (and 
trade), an HRBA puts the discussion in another perspective, that of legal entitlements, 
rights holders can claim against the State and other non-State actors. Hence, for 
example, the provision of water and sanitation services to the most vulnerable and 
marginalized communities as in the Urbaser case and many more to come including in 
India is no longer a charitable act but a State’s obligation to be fulfilled.  Of course, 
one of the dangers of an HRBA could be the multiplication of rights deprived of 
concrete substance (the right to development as an example) and so possible 
application as hardly justiciable. This normative hyper activity would prove 
counterproductive and so leads to the dilution of rights rather than to their fostering. 
However, an HRBA is not necessarily equivalent to rights inflation and eventually 
dilution. While HRBA re-politicizes international issues in calling for justice and 
equity, it can also be extremely concrete as based on a clear set of identified norms. A 
practical solution is then to concentrate on the normative nature of key human rights 
and human rights principle to define more narrowly HRBA. In this regard, The UN 
Statement of Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approaches to 
Development Cooperation and Programming (the Common Understanding) adopted 
by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in 2003 provides an interesting 
first definition (having in mind that the objective of the UN was that of harmonization 
between its many agencies). 43  The perspective is pragmatic to allow simple                                                         
42 See Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, para. 1195.  
43 See, The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common 
Understanding Among UN Agencies, available at: http://hrbaportal.org/the-human-rights-based-
approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding-among-un-agencies 
The Common Understanding is described as follows:  
“All programmes of development co-operation, policies and technical assistance should further the 
realization of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international human rights instruments.”  
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integration of theses HR principles into concrete UN agencies work and based on 
fundamental concepts: universality and inalienability; indivisibility; inter-dependence 
and inter-relatedness; non-discrimination and equality; participation and inclusion; 
accountability and the rule of law. Why would the State favour one right over another 
as the realization of one right depends on the realization of other rights? Why then 
give precedence over private property and not equality and inclusion, security at the 
cost of transparency and participation? This HRBA will not necessarily resolve 
difficult economic or social equations for developing States in particular, but in 
expressly linking economic situations to rights, it provides a basic conceptual 
framework for negotiations with domestic and foreign private actors, enables the 
public to participate to decision making and fosters States accountability. In doing so 
it also departs from as much as it renews the traditional international trade and 
investment approach often confined to risk prevention and remediation and exception 
justification. Lastly it supports CSR approaches and foster their implementation if 
providing some normative substance, a super legalization, which makes companies 
(and States) truly responsible and accountable not only on the basis of shared values 
but of rights common to all.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation and 
programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process.  
Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of ‘duty-bearers’ to meet 
their obligations and/or of ‘rights-holders’ to claim their rights”.  
